The governance structure of Portuguese and Spanish credit cooperatives: differences and similarities by Cabo, Paula et al.
The Governance Structure of Portuguese and Spanish Credit Cooperatives:
Differences and Similarities
Paula Cabo
Polytechnic Institute of  Bragança. Campus de Santa Apolónia, apart. 172, 5301-855 Bragança. Portugal.
E-mail. paulacabo@ipb.pt
Amparo Melián
Universidad Miguel Hernández. Campus de Orihuela. Dpto. Economía Agroambiental
Carretera de Beniel, km. 3,2 03312 Orihuela (Alicante).
E-mail. amparo.melian@umh.es
João Rebelo
Department of Economics, Sociology and Management (DESG) and CETRAD, University of Trás-os-Montes
and Alto Douro (UTAD), Av. Almeida Lucena, 1, 5000 – 911 Vila Real, Portugal.
E-mail: jrebelo@utad.pt
Paper prepared for presentation at
ICA XXII International Co-operatives Research Conference:
The Cooperative Response to Civil Society’s New Expectations
Paris, France
19th – 22th October 2006
Abstract
The literature recognizes that credit cooperatives are the “appropriate technology” for
relatively backward economies, but should fade away or disappear altogether as economic
development proceeds. However, surprisingly, they are among the fastest growing groups of
financial institutions in some advanced economies. Though the credit cooperatives in Portugal
and Spain present relatively small market shares, they perform a very important role in the
rural economy.
Over the last decades, the Iberian credit cooperatives have adopted a process of economic and
financial restructuring, through an intensive wave of mergers and the creation of banking
networks: Caja Rural Group, in Spain, and Crédito Agrícola Group, in Portugal. Despite that
common path, the Iberian reality is still very different.
In this paper we describe the historical roots of Portuguese and Spanish cooperative credit,
focusing our analysis on the governance structure, especially on the issues arising from the
strict application of traditional cooperative rules.
Key words: credit cooperatives, property rights, governance
1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that credit cooperatives can play a key role in the developing of
economic disadvantaged regions. Credit cooperative are typically seen as filling a market
niche consisting of low-income entrepreneurs, small businesspeople, or farmers who need
credit but who have essentially no collateral with which to secure a loan. That was the case of
Portuguese Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACC). Agriculture was (and still is) considered
a risky economic activity. This makes the availability and cost of agricultural credit an
enormous constraint to farmers, especially the smaller ones, who form the basis of Portuguese
agriculture.
In much of the literature on credit cooperatives is the notion that they are “appropriate
technology” for relatively backward economies, but should fade away or disappear altogether
as economic development proceeds. However, and surprisingly, they are among the fastest
growing groups of financial institutions in some advanced economies, namely Germany,
France, Finland or Netherlands, where credit cooperatives present 19, 21, 32 and 40% of
deposit market shares (Unacc, 2005b). Though the ACC1 in Portugal and Spain do not present
this kind of market shares, they perform a very important role in the rural economy.
Over the last decades, the Iberian credit cooperatives have adopted a process of economic and
financial restructuring, through an intensive wave of mergers and the creation of banking
networks: Caja Rural Group, in Spain, and Crédito Agrícola Group, in Portugal. Despite that
common path, they are very different.
Considering that an effective governance structure helps to improve performance and thereby
underpinning growth and boost the well being of the cooperative stakeholders and the local
community, in this paper we describe the historical roots of Portuguese and Spanish ACC,
focusing our analysis on the governance structure, especially on the issues arising from the
strict application of traditional cooperative rules.
Thus, the remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Section 2 provides a brief
description of the origins of agricultural cooperative credit in Portugal and Spain. Section 3
presents the governance structure of Portuguese and Spanish ACC and section 4 offers some
concluding remarks.
1 The Spanish Agricultural Credit Cooperatives are known as “Cajas Rurales” and the Portuguese Agricultural
Credit Cooperatives are known as “Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo”
2. The origins of agricultural credit cooperatives in Portugal and Spain
The origins of the Iberian agricultural cooperative credit go back to the 16th century, to the
Communitarian Granaries, an organization that lends seeds and other agricultural inputs to
small farmers with the corresponding return and interest usually paid in goods.
In the end of 19th century, the massive arrival of agro and cattle breeding products from
overseas resulted in ruin for many Europeans farmers. The technologic revolution in the long
course transportation lead to an enlargement of national and international transactions of farm
products, and the increase of competition generated a situation of supply surplus generalised
in the cereal sector and in less way in meat sector. The agricultural prices and incomes
decreased, although the intensity of this process varied accordingly to the measures taken to
address the problem. The most usual was the elevation of the customs tariffs. That protecting
barrier intended to keep national market for domestic producers, even if that meant higher
prices for the consumers, but it wasn’t enough to break the global tendency. The readdressing
of agricultural activity to new productions with a growing demand, as the vegetables and
fruits proved to be the most efficient answer. However, these agricultural transformations
emphasized the farmers’ difficulties in accessing financial services (Carnero and Nuez, 2002).
Agriculture was (and still is) considered a risky economic activity, so, banks were not
interested in agricultural credit, neither in loans to poor farmers. Additionally, the loans
offered by the local useres have high interest rates, impossible to sustain. This makes the
availability and cost of agricultural credit an enormous constraint to farmers, specially the
small ones, who are the basis of Iberian agriculture. Given that prevailing economic
environment, public entities considered agricultural cooperative credit the most appropriated
form of financial organization to reduce or eliminate this market failure (Cabo and Rebelo,
2005a; Martínez-Soto, 2003).
The genesis of Agricultural Credit Cooperatives occurs in German, being followed by other
countries (Table 1 bellow). Although its impact over the rural economies was not the same: in
Netherlands and Denmark or Switzerland the intense activity of these organizations allowed
them to overcome the recession, adapting to the new international market environment; in
France and Germany the effects were more moderated, and in Ireland and Occidental
Mediterranean Countries its incidence was null given that their development was weak
(Carnero and Nuez, 2002).
Table 1 – Evolution of ACC in Europe
Country Year of foundation # ACC in 1921-25
Germany
Italy
Belgium
France
Netherlands
Russia
Spain
Portugal
1869
1883
1892
1893
1895
1897
1892
1896
20.202
1.928
1.925
7.887
1.249
7.738
499
95
Source: Carnero and Nuez (2002) and Cabo (2003)
The legal birth of ACC occurs in 1906 in Spain and 5 years later in Portugal. The earliest
ACC were linked to the local agricultural syndicate and could not run outside its domains.
The majority of the Iberian ACC were of small size and membership consisted of small
farmers with low incomes. Additionally, the management activity was exercised by voluntary
individuals with no business or financier skills.
Guinnane (2001) suggests a range of problems affecting financial transactions in the rural
areas, resulting of ACC only carrying out very simple operations, usually lending. That is: (a)
fraud, by the decrease of cooperative’s resources via the theft of assets and the alteration of
accountability books, or via self-interest operations, like provide loans to individuals less
reputable associated with management members; (b) difficulties in maintaining in order the
accountability books reflecting the input and output flows, and (c) mismanagement,
consequent of bad strategic decisions, usually because of the lack of management expertises
and other skills to perform the work.
This first period was of absolute failure: in one hand, the capital provided by the state was
insufficient to accomplish the objectives; by other hand, cooperatives were used to pursuit
managers’ personal goals, being common to find management mistakes and even frauds when
audited (Cabo, 2003).
The fail of these state interventions rely on the assumption that it was a problem of will
(bankers lack of will to serve small farmers and userers will to explore these farmers) and not
a problem of difficulty. According to this belief, the only needs were a legislative intervention
and the supply of financial support. Consequently, state interventions were unable to remove
the obstacles that limit the development of financial services in rural areas and to reduce the
costs originated by the efforts to overcoming these difficulties. The boundary of rural finances
can not be expanded by regulations and laws (Martínez-Soto, 2003).
Still, in the second quarter of the twentieth century the state discover another function of the
agricultural credit cooperatives: these organizations were used to restrict the expansion of the
communist ideology and to control the rural population. So, state and big farmers join efforts
to encourage syndicates and agricultural cooperatives as a way to reduce social conflicts.
This new mission for the agricultural credit cooperatives was supported by some legal
arrangements. In Portugal, these cooperatives were putted under the dependency of Caixa
Geral de Depósitos, a state owned and simultaneously the biggest Portuguese bank institution.
Under this enslavement the Portuguese ACC hibernated until the democratization of the
country, consequence of the carnation revolution in 25th April of 1974. Until 1976, the
Portuguese ACC had a reduced role in Portuguese banking activity, with a share of only 1%
of total deposits and credit. Following the 1974 political changes, Portuguese ACC were
considered in the framework of a financing strategy for the development of the agricultural
sector. So, during the eighties of last century the Portuguese ACC activity showed a
spectacular energy, expressed by annual growth rates for deposits and credits of, on average,
40 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively. Nowadays, the set of Portuguese ACC  is the second
largest national banking network with a standalone brand (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005a).
The supply of an efficient and sustainable financial service to rural populations implies the
accomplishment of a range of conditions, specially the reduction of transaction costs, which
was difficult to achieve for banks in the earlier years. It was complicated to set up healthy
financial relationships and it was costly to gather “informational capital” about the clients.
Cooperatives have two competitive advantages: their clients are their members, so the costs of
gathering “informational capital” were reduced, additionally, because all cooperative
members solidarity respond to the cooperative losses, they actively monitor each others.
The micro financing services provided by the earliest ACC was not totally unsuccessful. In
some regions (Navarra, Valencia, Murcia, and Andalucía) they obtain relatively good results
regarding territorial coverage and sustainability, which allowed them to supply financial
services (lending) to low income clients (Martínez-Soto, 2003).
During the last two decades the world banking industry has been exposed to a multitude of
new developments and challenges. Globalization, economic integration, deregulation,
technological progress and an increasing financial culture are significantly reshaping the
industry. The banking scene has changed even more radically in the European Union (EU),
where the introduction of the “European passport” (the EU-wide banking permission) in 1992
and the single currency (for EMU countries) in 1999 have removed institutional obstacles to
compete in the whole EU market. This changing banking environment has focused attention
on the competitive conditions in Europe and on the viability of its sheltered banks.
In order to confront this competition, credit cooperatives have opted for integration strategies
and inter-cooperation between entities in order to operate in the financial market, without
losing  the competitive advantage of personalization, the key to their functioning, and
combining universal banking and specialised banking principles. So, in the nineties of the last
century, following the tendency of other European credit cooperative systems, the Iberian
ACC engage in the creation of economic groups and, simultaneously, a concentration process
thought mergers operations to achieve minimum efficient size.
So, in 1989, 24 Spanish ACC found the Associación Española de Cajas Rurales (AECR),
which will be the foundation of the financial group Caja Rural, to establish strong bonds
between the credit cooperatives, to improve their structures, functioning and organization
within the bank system (Melián, 2004).
The Spanish ACC form a cooperative banking system whish is formed as a model of a
federate bank similar to other European systems. Nowadays, the Caja Rural Group is the fifth
most important Spanish banking group. The Group includes 96% of the Spanish ACC (74 of
77) which represent 97% of the total assets of Spanish ACC. Only three entities have not
joined the group. In figures, the group has a 6% market share of deposits, assets up to 50,000
million euro, 4,200 branches spread across the country and approximately 15,100 employees
(Unacc, 2005a).
Credit cooperative partnerships which are the basis of European cooperative banking systems
participate in the decision making of central cooperative banks through their representatives.
The associated ACC has mixed organizational structures, maintaining their individual
structures for the traditional business but developing the banking federation model at the
group level. The basic characteristics of this model of federate bank are based on the fulfilling
principles of decentralization, subsidiary, solidarity, inter-cooperation and territorial (Palomo,
2000).
Cooperative banking systems consist of specialised institutions which offer centralised
banking and parabanking services to credit cooperatives, such as insurance, funds,
management, infrastructure and logistics as well as centralised processing of information.
Thanks to economies of scale in the management of a volume of operations, the profitability
of such processes rises and the excess of cost in offering these services individually decreases.
The AECR is the institution that coordinates and represents the Group which credit
cooperatives are linked to. To support the Caja Rural Group activities, other companies were
created, like the Banco Cooperativo Español2 (BCE), in 1990, an informatics firm: Rural
Servicios Informáticos3 and an insurance firm: Seguros RGA4, both in 1986 (Ibarrondo,
2002).
The BCE is the central bank5 for the associated ACC. It coordinates the ACC financial
policies, acts as an ACC agent in some operations and supplies specific financial services.
Although the BCE follows the same line as its European homologous, it stands out among
them for the fact that part of its share capital belongs to a central entity of another nationality.
So, Spanish ACC have 85% of the BCE equity proportionally to their assets and the
remaining 15% belong to the Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank (DZ Bank), the German
central cooperative bank (Melián, 2004).
In 1998, the BCE joined the UNICO Banking Group. This group, created in 1977, is made up
of the central entities of the most important European banking groups, as the German DZ
Bank, the Austrian Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB), the Belgian KBC Group, the OKOBANK
of Finland, the Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA) of France, the Dutch
RABOBANK, the Unión Suiza de Bancos Raiffesisen of Switzerland  and the Italian Instituto
di Credito delle Banche di Crédito Cooperativo. Its aim is to achieve international cooperation
of the European cooperative bank.
In Portugal, although the creation of an economic group took place a couple of years later, in
1992, the Credito Agrícola Group is formed by firms covering a wide range of services, from
insurance to informatic services, and so on. See the organigram of the group in appendix.
We can see that the range of companies that compose the Crédito Agrícola Group is very
similar to the Caja Rural Group, with Caixa Central assuming, simultaneously, the functions
2 The BCE is composed by several societies: Rural Inmobiliario, SL – a real-state firm; Gescooperativo, SGIIC,
SA – an investment funds management firm; Rural Informática, SA; Espiga Capital Gestión, SGSCR – a
capital of risk management firm; and BCE Formacion, SA.
3 The Rural Servicios Informáticos, is the company in charge of the definition and implementation of the
automatic information processing system.
4 Seguros RGA is the insurance entity for all the associated ACC. It was created with the aim of expanding the
range of products offered by this ACC, introducing them in the insurance field. It is composed by four firms:
Seguros Generales Rural, SA; Rural Vida, SA; Rural Pensiones, SA and RGA Broker Correduría de Seguros,
SA.
5 Central cooperative banks are partnerships though shares, which are legally established as mainly limited
companies, whose shareholders are credit co-operatives which form each respective system of cooperative
banking.
of the Spanish BCE and the AECR coordinating and representing functions. Nonetheless,
there are some significant differences that we must highlight, differences linked to the way
the Group’s companies are managed and the relation between the associated ACC and the
system itself.
An evidence of these differences is given by the way the groups present their annual accounts.
In the Portuguese Crédito Agrícola the annual accounts are consolidated, i.e., the accounts of
the various companies’ group are presented altogether in only one report. In the Spanish Caja
Rural the annual accounts are presented individual by the various companies, i.e., there is
presented the annual report of BCE, the annual report of AECR, the annual report of RGA,
and so on. Another difference, already referred, is the participation of a foreign entity in the
capital of Spanish ACC central bank. Plus, the coordinating and representing functions of
Portuguese Caixa Central go farther than the Spanish AECR case, as we will see in the next
section.
The creation of banking groups was followed by a concentration phenomenon, through ACC
mergers. This phenomenon was much more intense in the Portuguese case, as we will see.
When the Portuguese ACC system (SICAM) was created in 1992, 211 ACC participated on it.
Cabo (2003) illustrates the SICAM situation at that time: “From the ACC with deposits under
10 million euro, 86% presented a solvency ratio below 4; that percentage drops to 58% on
the middle size ACC and to 46% on the big ones. The administrative costs per deposit unit
were, on small size ACC (deposits < 10 million euros), 43% superior to SICAM average, and
52% above the big ACC average”. The same study refers that to generate consistent returns; a
typical ACC must have a volume of deposits up to 70 million euro, value not achieved by
96,6% of the ACC!
The restrictions to internal growth imposed by the AAC characteristic6, the lack of funding
and time, let SICAM decision makers to engage an intense process of mergers. This process
was so intense that, in ten years, the ACC’ average assets grewed more than four times (Cabo,
2003), and in 2005 the number of ACC was reduced to 111. Table 2 below shows the
Portuguese merger process evolution.
6
 The activity of Portuguese ACC is restricted to the county (“concelho”) where it is located, i.e., the ACC are
regional organizations and their product markets are limited.
Table 2 - Portuguese ACC Merger Activity
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
# of ACC involved 11 27 17 20 25 4 19 9 10 11 8 6 18
# operations 3 10 7 8 11 2 9 4 5 5 4 3 8
Table 3 - Spanish ACC Merger Activity
1990 1991 1993 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005
# of ACC involved 2 4 4 2 2 4 6 9 4 2
# operations 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 4 2 1
As we can see, the concentration phenomenon is much more expressive in the Portuguese
case. Not only the number of merger operations is higher, but also, mergers involving more
than two ACC are a usual event. While in the Spanish ACC only one merger operation
involve more than two partners (three ACC and creates the second biggest Spanish ACC), in
Portugal there are two mergers operations involving seven ACC!
Comparatively to their Spanish pairs Portuguese ACC are much more smaller7 which explain
this energetic merging activity. According to Cabo and Rebelo (2005a) size is a fundamental
issue for ACC. The small ACC suffer growth difficulties that prevent them from reaching a
minimum efficient size, which would allow them, for example, to support technology
investments and to recruit qualified staff.
Strange is the occurrence of merger operations between Saving Banks and Spanish ACC, the
last ones being incorporated, in the three events we observe. That occurrence was never
experienced in Portugal, where ACC only merger with their pairs.
3. The Governance Structure of Portuguese and Spanish ACC
Except banking operations, like other cooperative organizations, Portuguese and Spanish
ACC are governed following the traditional cooperative structure with open membership,
democratic control and restricted residual claims. The strict application of these rules can
promote a set of vaguely defined property rights, namely free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control
problems and influence costs, with negative effects on the transaction costs (Cook and
Iliopoulos, 2001).
7
 The 111 ACC integrating Portuguese the system in 2005 have only 600 branches, and assets up to 9.000
million euros.
Table 4 shows the main features of Spanish and Portuguese ACC. Although, Iberian ACC
have some differences with effects on their performance, specially, regarding the product
range, the democratic decision making, return on equity, governance bodies and supervision
entity.
The activity of Portuguese ACC, both in deposits and credit, is essentially centred on the
agricultural sector, with a restrictive product range what carries the risk of specialization.
After Portugal joined the European Union, in 1986, Portuguese agriculture witnessed
economic erosion, negatively conditioning the profitability of the financial institutions more
directly involved in agriculture ventures (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005a).
This limitation was overcome by Portuguese ACC through the Caixa Central. Acting as
central ACC agent, single ACC can perform various operations out of their product market
and “services to members only” restrictions. Additionally, through the singles, the Caixa
Central, beside deposits and loans, offers a wide range of financial services, including, for
instance, insurance operations, financial advice, and exchange foreign currency.
Democratic decision making carries some well known costs (as the monitoring problem, the
follow-up problem, the influence cost problem and the decision problem) which rise as
membership becomes more heterogeneous, reducing the commitment and increasing the free
rider problem (Bijman, 2002; Spgard, 1994). Democratic decision making is the rule both in
Portugal and Spain, but in the Spanish case one important exception is made. That is not the
case in Portugal where member power is always independent of the participation in the
equity, which disincentives to major participations (free rider problem). Additionally, when
the cooperative follow the rule of one-member-one-vote regardless of the amount of equity
held, votes cannot be accumulated into blocks and there can be no monitoring by block
shareholders (as suggested by Becht et al. (2002)). Consequently, the costs of changing
control over these banks are high. In the Spanish ACC, the proportional exception to
democratic decision making and the possibility of delegate voting power, allows overcoming
this constraint.
The equity problem referred above is inflamed by the return on equity issue. Portuguese law
requires that the net benefits be transferred into reserves, with only 30% of returns allowed to
be distributed, which constitutes a disincentive to invest in the ACC, therefore the
participation on the equity has as an exclusive aim: the benefit from the services of the
organization, mainly credit. As noted by Nilsson (2001), the property rights allocation within
the traditional cooperative structure does not provide members with the necessary incentives
to invest, causing negative consequences in the capital structure. Figure B, in appendix,
contains a description of the consequences/effects of the “cooperative nature” on the financial
structure of Portuguese ACC.
Portuguese ACC have three governance bodies (Figure 5): general assembly, management
board8 and audit board. The general assembly includes all the members of the coop and
usually meets twice a year, one for the appreciation of the annual activities plan and
concomitant budget, and the other for the appreciation of the annual operating activities plan
and budget, and the annual activities report which includes the balance sheet and income
statements.
The ACC is run by the management board9 that is elected by the general assembly and his
main task is to oversee the daily operations of the cooperative. The audit board, also elected
by the general assembly, has as main task to assure to the members that the AAC is being
managed according to the law and the cooperative principles and that annual balance sheets
and income statements reflect the true economic and financial position of the cooperative.
8 The common designation (in the literature) is board of directors, but considering the small scale of ACCs
operations and their organizational structure, management board seems to be more appropriated to describe
their role.
9 The board of management usually includes three members who must be elected among the ACC members.
Management skills are required. Thus, the board of management can include two additional individuals
(management experts) not members of the ACC.
Table 4 - Main features of Spanish and Portuguese ACC
Portuguese ACC Spanish ACC
Product ACC activity is restricted to a limited range of operations connected to the rural
world and to
Members only
ACC activity is not restricted to specific operations; the only requisite is the
supply of financial services to rural communities.
The “members only” condition applies.
Members Open membership.
Natural and legal persons allowed but must be connected to agricultural
activities.
Open membership. Natural and legal persons allowed.
To found an ACC is required one Agricultural Cooperative or fifteen farmers as
members founders.
Territory ACC activity is restricted to the county (“concelho”) where it is located. The
expansion outside is only allowed to neighbour counties and if no other ACC
operates there.
ACC activity is restricted to their territory, as defined is their statutes. The
expansion to outside must be preceded by the equity changes needed.
Equity Minimum fixed. Minimum amount variable according to their territory and the number of
habitants living on it.
Shares Minimum share. Minimum share.
Maximum of 20% if the member is a legal person and maximum of 2.5% if the
member is an individual person.
Capital Market No market to capital shares
Shares only transferable to the ACC itself and only if legal requirements of
minimum equity, reserves and solvency ratio is accomplished.
No market to capital shares
Shares only transferable to the ACC itself and only if legal requirements of
minimum equity, reserves and solvency ratio is accomplished.
Return on equity Transferable to reserves
Once the legal reserves requirements and solvency ratios are accomplished, the
exceeding can be distributed to the members until the maximum 30% of it.
Transferable to reserves
Once the legal reserves requirements and solvency ratios are accomplished, the
exceeding can be distributed to the members according to the ACC statutes.
Distribution to employees is contemplated..
Democratic Decision
Making
One member – one vote
Member power independent of the participation in the equity
One member – one vote
Exception: If ACC statutes contemplate it, member power can proportional: (a) to
the member shares, (b) to the member activities with the ACC, or (c) to the
number of cooperative members if it’s a cooperative.
Limits of 20% if the member is a legal person and of 2.5% if the member is an
individual person.
Votes can be delegated to other members, respecting the limited previously
referred.
Governance Bodies General Assembly, Management Board and Audit Board General Assembly and Governing Board
Supervision Entity Bank of Portugal. Caixa Central Bank of Spain. Autonomous Communities
Figure 5 – Portuguese ACC Governance scheme.
General Assembly
Principle of  Democratic Control
Competences Election of the governance bodies;
Sanction of the  ACC annual  operating activities plan, budget and report of
activities  proposed by the board of management;
Approval of ACC merger or liquidation;
Determination of the ACC governance bodies payments.
    Management Board Audit Board
Elaboration of the ACC annual operating plan and
budget;
Management of the ACC operations;
Elaboration of the ACC annual activities report
and balance sheets and income statements.
Monitoring all ACC activity, ensuring
compliance with the law and ACC statutes.
Spanish law only request that credit cooperatives have 2 governance bodies: the general
assembly and the governing board. Figure 6 below illustrates the Spanish ACC governance
scheme.
Figure 6 – Spanish ACC Governance scheme.
General Assembly
Principle of  Democratic Control
Competences Election of the Governing Board;
Sanction of the  ACC annual  operating activities plan, budget and report of
activities  proposed by the board of management;
Approval of ACC merger or liquidation;
Governing Board
Designation, hire and fire of the General Director
Direction
Elaboration of the ACC annual operating plan and budget;
Management of the ACC operations;
Elaboration of the ACC annual activities report and balance sheets and income
statements.
Comparing the two models of corporate governance we highlight the absence in the Spanish
ACC of an audit board. The fact of the law does not require it is quite strange, considering the
quasi-public nature of the cooperatives. Despite that, the bigger ACC usually have one audit
board on their structure, answering to direction. Besides, that fail in the law is partially
overcome through the requirement of an auditor’s report on the annual accounts, which is not
requested in the Portuguese ACC case (only in the group annual accounts case it is required).
Regarding supervision, both Portuguese and Spanish ACC are subject to the central bank
supervision, Bank of Portugal and Bank of Spain, although there are some differences too.
In the Portuguese case part of the supervision functions of Bank of Portugal are passed to
Caixa Central. So, in terms of the governance, the Caixa Central is responsible for the
coordination and the control of all the affiliated10 singles' operational processes, i. e., it is the
guardian of the system with a high capacity to interfere in the management of the singles and
even replace their board of management.
The higher the transaction costs of changing control, the greater the inefficiency must be to
trigger a change (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). In the Portuguese ACC system control changes
are usually proposed by the central ACC that operates the auditing function and therefore, is
the first to learn about managerial failures. In cases of gross management failure or fraud, the
management can be formally discharged by the Caixa Central. Long-term inefficiencies can
be solved through obligated mergers with more efficient ACC. ACC mergers act as an
external control mechanism because, although mergers are friendly (they must be approved
by the general assembly) the influence of central ACC is considerable, being this top
institution the trigger and even the one that choose the merger partners (Cabo, 2003).
To illustrate the importance of Caixa Central supervision powers, see Cabo and Rebelo
(2005b) study on the control mechanisms of Portuguese ACC. Cabo and Rebelo (2005b)
identify two types of governance mechanisms in Portuguese ACC: internal governance
mechanisms, as management board or chairman change mechanisms and external governance
mechanisms, as mergers and Caixa Central intervention11, by a Caixa Central nomination
agent or even a management board replacement. The authors conclude that the first are not
10
  ACC are free to stay out of the ACCIS, but in that situation they must comply with the more demanding
regulations applied to the other institutions of the Portuguese banking system.
11
 In the 9 years period of the study (1995-2003), the authors identity 51 Caixa Central ACC interventions
corresponding to ACC with a Caixa Central agent nomination and 79 board management board replacements.
related to the ACC performance, which indicates potential weakness of the ACC internal
control mechanisms.
In the Spanish ACC case we do not recognize this type of intervention by the AECR,
supervision power are in the Bank of Spain domains only. In the period 1997-2005, Spanish
credit cooperatives experienced 17 disciplinary proceedings by Bank of Spain, none of them
in the 2002-2004 period. Unfortunately, we were not able to know who these cooperatives
are, but, considering that ACC represent 93% of the credit cooperatives operating in Spain,
this number can say anything (or nothing).
4. Conclusion
Iberian ACC have very similar histories, a common birth and parallel youth paths. Their
legally appeared in the beginning of the twentieth century, usually created in a top-down
process. Connected to the rural economy their financial health is a reflection of rural economy
health. However, in a world where agriculture and the rural economy are losing place ACC
must readdress their operations and modus operandus to survive.
In the last decades various structural changes have an impact on the intensity of application of
cooperative principles and contribute to its identity crisis. This context results in conflicts in
the definition of the ACC’ mission and on a deficient ability to raise equity capital, what can
jeopardise the ACC survival, at least, their cooperative form.
Except banking operations, the Portuguese and Spanish ACC are ruled following the
traditional cooperative structure with open membership, democratic control and restricted
residual claims. Although, Iberian ACC have some differences with effects on their
performance, specially, regarding the product range, the democratic decision making and
return on equity. These differences brake the negative investment cycle originated on the
property rights allocation within traditional cooperative structure, and reduce monitoring
costs. At the present, Bank of Portugal and SICAM authorities are negotiating a new legal
framework for Portuguese ACC activity. Look to other cooperative groups and learn with
their experience should be beneficial to the future of Portuguese ACC.
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Figure A - Organigram of the ACC Group
Figure B – Cooperative principles and financial structure of ACC
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